Constitutional rights in regulating tenancy in common conversions: Tom v San Francisco. 2004 by Bernhardt, Roger
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications Faculty Scholarship
2004
Constitutional rights in regulating tenancy in
common conversions: Tom v San Francisco. 2004
Roger Bernhardt
Golden Gate University School of Law, rbernhardt@ggu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bernhardt, Roger, "Constitutional rights in regulating tenancy in common conversions: Tom v San Francisco. 2004" (2004).
Publications. Paper 269.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/269
Constitutional rights in regulating tenancy in common conversions: 
Tom v San Francisco. 2004 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Ordinance forbidding residential tenants-in-common agreements from providing for 
exclusive rights of occupancy in particular unit by individual owners violated California 
constitutional right of privacy. 
Tom v City & County of San Francisco (2004) 120 CA4th 674, 16 CR3d 13 
When home buyers acquire a multi-unit building as tenants-in-common (TIC), in general, as 
co-owners, they each have an equal right to occupy any part of their property. They may, 
however, agree among themselves to give each owner an exclusive right of occupancy (ERO) in 
a particular dwelling unit in the overall TIC property. The San Francisco Board of Supervisors 
passed an ordinance forbidding ERO agreements in order to discourage the use of TIC 
agreements in the conversion of rental housing to owner-occupied housing. The ordinance 
generally requires that all parties to a TIC have a right of access to all units on the property. The 
effect of the ordinance is that unrelated persons who reside in multi-unit buildings would be 
required to share occupancy of their dwelling units with each other, or could not prevent other 
cotenants from entering their private living space. Property owners sought a writ of mandate to 
overturn the ordinance, contending, among other things, that it violated their constitutional right 
of privacy in their homes. The trial court granted the writ. 
The court of appeal affirmed. The court held that the ordinance violated the right of privacy in 
the home granted by Cal Const art 1, §1. The court explained that a violation of the state 
constitutional right to privacy requires: 
• A legally protected privacy interest; 
• A reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and 
• Conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy. 
The court stated that there is an “autonomy privacy” interest in choosing the persons with 
whom a person will reside and in excluding others from one’s private residence, and that it is 
obviously reasonable to expect privacy in one’s own home. The court opined that having 
unwelcome persons residing in one’s home, or roaming throughout one’s home, would amount 
to a serious invasion of privacy rights. Because the property owners established an invasion of 
privacy, the City had to show “that the invasion of privacy is justified because it substantively 
furthers one or more countervailing interests.” The City did not bear that burden. The court 
stated that while providing more rental housing may be a laudable goal, in this case it was not a 
sufficiently strong countervailing interest because the ordinance was forbidden by the Ellis Act 
(Govt Code §§7060–7060.7) and because a governmental interest in precluding homeowners 
from going out of the landlord business did not justify the extreme privacy violation. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: It is somewhat surprising that the court of appeal elected to 
resolve this issue on the constitutional ground of privacy rather than the lesser, more 
technical, ground of preemption; but maybe that is because the preemption issue was more 
difficult to resolve. I don’t find anything in the Ellis Act that lets me readily conclude that, 
because the state prohibits communities from compelling landlords to stay in the apartment 
rental business, those towns must also leave tenancies-in-common (TICs) alone. 
Actually, a surprising feature of tenancy-in-common is that it is so little regulated by 
statute. Apart from a definitional section that says absolutely nothing—see CC §685: “An 
interest in common is one owned by several persons, not in joint ownership or 
partnership."—this form of concurrent ownership is just unregulated. 
That omission has two significant consequences for potential TICers. On the one hand, it 
means that they can agree to just about anything they want; nothing is forbidden by statute; 
and now, under this case, much is constitutionally protected. On the other hand, owners of 
TICs better do a lot of agreeing, because there are no safe harbors and no guideposts; it is 
not the same as saying “I do” and thereby importing the entire Family Code into the 
agreement. 
Although published forms are available, co-ownership agreements are not likely to be 
simple documents and may require some creative drafting. For example, the parties have to 
decide such matters as their respective contributions and percentage interests, management 
and control, restrictions on selling, leasing, financing, and the treatment of defaults. For 
attorneys, it would be like trying to force clients to think about what happens to inheritance 
rights if a child dies before the parents, and similarly unpleasant speculations. (A Davis-
Stirling type of act for all common ownership interests might save a lot of paper.) 
For as long as there is municipal rent control, some residents will keep trying to evade it 
and the cities will keep trying to cut off their escape routes. Condominium conversions have 
been more or less successfully stymied, but conversions to TICs are now more resistant than 
they were. Assuming that these TIC conversions cannot be stopped, lawyers can expect to 
spend more time in constructing them and managing them properly. 
Of course, cities can choose not to be bothered by these TICs: While it is true that a TIC 
conversion removes a housing unit from the rental market, it does not take the unit off the 
housing market. Both before and after the conversion, San Francisco has the same number 
of housing units, with approximately the same number of persons living in them. It is hard 
to see who suffers if the removal of a unit from the rental market through TIC conversion 
also removes its occupants from the rental population, because its occupants are now 
owners rather than tenants. 
The supreme court has been asked to review this case, so the future of TICs remains 
uncertain. But if this decision survives, we will certainly see more conversions. If San 
Francisco can no longer block them, this may be a good time to reconsider the restriction on 
condominium conversions, since most owners possessing candidates for conversion would 
surely prefer the advantages of a condominium over the difficulties of a tenancy-in-
common. —Roger Bernhardt  
 
